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Abstract
Purpose – The paper aims to give an account to describe the way the South-South development
programme is realized between Taiwan and Belize.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is the result of ethnographic fieldwork research
combined with a literature study.
Findings – The development of the newly industrialized country Taiwan can be characterized by a
drastic transformation from an impoverished agrarian society towards an affluent industrial economy.
Now, Taiwan is aiming to help other developing countries to walk the same path by drawing lessons
from their so-called “Taiwan experience”. In order to transfer their experience, Taiwan has established
an overseas development organization, the International Cooperation and Development Fund. This
organization offers development assistance to countries of which Taiwan receives political
recognition. Central and South America are the regions where most of Taiwan’s diplomatic ties exist.
One of the recipients of Taiwanese assistance in this area is Belize, a small English speaking, Central
American country in the Caribbean Sea, with a multi-ethnic, densely populated, relatively poor
population.
Research limitations/implications – Future research might examine the ways in which these
Taiwanese farmers have integrated in Belize and how their entrepreneurial activities contribute in this
process.
Practical implications – After visiting Taiwan’s project sites in Belize and interviewing
government officials, Taiwanese-Belizeans, Belizean farmers, and non-farmers, it was found that
much of what the Taiwanese brought was indeed considered beneficial, although incomplete. The
links between the Taiwanese development organization and the wider society, Belize, were not clearly
developed at the time, not least because of the problems in communicating with the Taiwanese
development workers(for instance due to language issues). It would be wrong to suggest, however,
that Taiwan’s development project was only perceived as raising problems for it did have a positive
impact.
Originality/value – Although the first Taiwanese project in Belize was launched in 1989 it has until
recently received little attention. This paper explores the social impact of this development project
from the Taiwanese in Belize.
Keywords Developing countries, Economic development, International cooperation,
Project management, Taiwan, Belize
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Development assistance constitutes one of the major international operations of the
second half of the twentieth century. Within that time development assistance has been
provided in a variety of contexts for motives ranging from the most humanitarian to the
most overtly political (Dana, 2001; Rist, 2002, p. 1). The diversity of development
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mechanisms, and motives for its provision, makes development assistance a wide and
controversial topic. The rationale behind development assistance has been one of the
main controversial themes in North-South relations. The north has constantly been
critisized for using development assistance to project economic and political influence
in the developing world[1]. Moreover, western states have been accused of using
development assistance as a way of maintaining the post-independence relationship and
practising influence in their former colonies (Bobiash, 1992, p. 1). There have been
presented only a few examples of western countries with true philantophic intentions
in their development programs. The conditionalities and restictions often attached to
development activities, as a result of the prevailing political and economic motives, are
often presented as the main explanations for the many failures of North-South
development programs. In fact, despite 50 years of development assistance from the
north, most developing countries remained on the margins of the international
community. These development interventions have failed to diminish southern
dependence on the developed world or increase changes towards development.
The aim to reduce (economic-) dependency of the developing world on the
industrialized north has become one of the central objectives of the cooperation between
developing countries, hence, South-South cooperation. A large and growing number
of developing countries are now also providing development assistance to reduce
dependence on expertise and technologies from the north. The influence of dependency
theory on South-South cooperation is manifest in its objectives and terminology (Mihyo,
1990, p. 220). Central objectives of South-South cooperation are to reduce the gap
between “centre and pheriphery” and to avoid “unequal exchange” inherent in
North-South relations. South-South cooperation is used as a strategy to promote
economic independency, increase self-reliance and improve bargaining power with
developed countries (Bobiash, 1992, p. 6).
Although there are many forms of South-South cooperation such as trade and
investment, development assistance is the most common form in which it occurs,
especially in the form of technical cooperation. In the field of technical cooperation alone,
a United Nations (UN) report lists 77 developing countries that are either providing or
receiving this form of development assistance.
This idea of South-South cooperation was first rooted at the Afro-Asian Bandung
Conference of 1955 (Mihyo, 1990, p. 220). Even though most African and Asian countries
were still colonies at that time, commitments were made in which solidarity was
considered both an objective and a tool for third world development. For over three
decades, numerous third world organizations, statesmen and intellectuals have
advocated greater South-South cooperation. Key proponenents have been Tanzania’s
Nyerere, Mexico’s Echeverria, and Malaysia’s Mahathir.
Many developing countries are providing development assistance ostensibly as an
act of solidarity with other developing countries, and believe that this assistance is in
some ways better applicable than that provided by the wealthier developed states
(Szirmai, 2005). This premise is based on the conviction that developing countries face
many common conditions and problems of underdevelopment; have a common interest
in improving their position in the international system; and, in many cases, have
complementary recources which can be used for their mutual benefit (Dana, 1996;
Hamilton and Dana, 2008). The question is then whether development assistance from
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the south is indeed an act of solidarity and more appropriate than assistance provided by
the north.
Until now, an unambigious answer cannot be given for the succes of South-South
cooperation has been mixed. In addition, different approaches of South-South
development assistance have evolved. There is, however, a growing debate as to the
validity of applying the term “developing country” to many of the southern donor
countries. For instance, the newly industrializing countries have become major economic
powers (Mahbubani, 2008). In fact, in many cases the differences between a southern donor
and recipient may be just as profound as the differences between a northern donor and its
recipient developing country.
A prime illustration of this is the donor country of this study, the newly industializing
country Taiwan. Even though Taiwan used to be a relatively poor country it now belongs
to the most wealthiest nations on earth. Therefore, the question of the transferability of the
Taiwan experience to other developing countries is a growing theme. There have been
keen interest in whether lessons from Taiwan can be applied elsewhere (Ito, 1997). It coule
be argued that development assistance from Taiwan would be advantageous for the
southern recipient country, because Taiwan knows what it is like to be poor. These
proponents of South-South cooperation share the conviction that solutions from the south
would be better suitable to developing countries in the south. Others (Chan, 1997; Szirmai,
2005), on the contrary, are convinced that the Taiwan experience is not transferrable at all.
They argue that the succes of Taiwan is due to a unique combination of domestic, political,
geographical, and cultural historical factors and is therefore impossible to transfer.
By examining the Taiwanese development project in Belize, this paper adds to this
development debate. Hence, agricultural technologies that worked well in Taiwan are
now being introduced in the developing country Belize with a different cultural and
physical environment.This study attempts to identify the essential characteristics of
South-South development cooperation as it is actually applied. By exploring the export
of the “Taiwan experience”, light is shed on South-South development assistance.
Methodology
The data presented in this paper are the result of an ethnographic research conducted in
the Belize from March 2005 until August 2005. Since the research aims to provide an
insight into the reality of a certain group of people (the Taiwanese farmers) within their
everyday settings, several qualitative research methods were used to obtain information
about the development project in this region. The research subject was approached as
a case study with an intrinsic as well as an instrumental focus (Stake, 2003). This means
that the case is used to provide an insight into this particular subject (the Belizean
situation), as well as to facilitate the understanding of a more general issue (South-South
development projects). The purpose of the study is to gain an understanding of the
situation within its context, rather than generalization beyond (Stake, 2003). For this
reason the choice was made to conduct qualitative ethnographic field research, during
a period of six months. The best way to gain an insight in the daily practice of the
farmers is through participant observation. By using a conversational method and
a non-quantitative ethnographic strategy, general information was obtained and
informants were selected for further questioning (Dana and Dana, 2005). The general
information, combined with a document and literature study provided the researcher
with a topic list for the open-ended, in-depth interviews. These interviews were
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conducted with several types of informants. The largest group of informants contained
the Taiwanese farmers, as these are the subject of the research. The interviews had an
informal character and usually took place in the natural environment of the farmers.
Beside this group of informants, some explorative interviews were conducted with a
variety of government officials. These interviews were more structured and formal.
The informants from the first group were selected with help of our Taiwanese key
informant. The informants of the second group were selected and approached according
to their function within the government.
This paper starts by giving an overview of Belizean context followed by a description
of the economic situation of this country. Special attention will be given to the Taiwanese
development organization, the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) –
Taiwan in Belize. This description will lead on to the local responses towards ICDF in
Belize illustrated with case descriptions of governmental responses and non farmers and
farmer’s responses. The paper ends with a conclusion of the findings.
The context: Belize
Belize is a relative small country (22.965 square kilometer) which is enclosed by Mexico
in the north and by Guatemala in the west and south. Although, geographically located
in Central America the country (especially the coastal area) has a Caribbean vibe and is
considered as a part of the Caribbean basin (Roessingh et al., 2005). Belize is situated in
Central America, nevertheless, in contrast to the other countries in the region, the official
language of Belize is English, a heritage of British colonial rule. Belize was a British
colony from 1862 until 1981 (Shoman, 1987), in June of 1973 the name of the country was
changed from British Honduras to Belize. This can be seen as a first consequence
of self-government, and a first step towards independence. Although Belize gained
self-government in 1973, it was not until the 21st of September 1981 that Belize received
its independence. While Belize has been independent for 25 years, it is still part of the
British commonwealth, today merely a ceremonial task – the Queen of Great Britain is
officially still the head-of-state for Belize and the prime-minister of Belize is governing
the country on her behalf.
The country has a multi-ethnic population consisting of, amongst others, Mestizos,
Creoles, Garinagu, Maya’s, Mennonites, Taiwanese, Chinese, and east Indian (Sutherland,
1998). The Maya people are thought to be one of the first inhabitants of Belize. Most of
them were farmers then, and they still are today (Bolland, 1988). The Mennonites came to
Belize from Mexico around 1958. These Swiss-German descendants came to Belize in
search for cheap land and a place were they could life in isolation from the wider
community (Roessingh, 2007). The Creole population used to be a majority in the country
but due to the Central American immigration (and Creole emmigration to the USA) these
proportions have drastically changed. Currently, the Mestizo population is in the majority
in the country.
After independence Belize has been receiving the most foreign population within the
whole Central American region. Moreover, nowadays about 15 percent (2,000 est.) of the
Belizean population consists of foreigners (Ayanegui and Vittrap, 2000) First, there have
been major streams of refugees and displaced persons fleeing from war in Guatamala,
El Salvador, and Honduras (Palacio, 1990, p. 16). They had been coming into Belize
before that, but now they came in with greater numbers. The Belizean Refugee
Department reported that an estimated 30,000 Central American refugees entered Belize.
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In a country with a small population of approximately 301,000 inhabitants (Belizean
Government, 2008) developments like this are not unnoticed. Even though the economic
assimilation went quite well, the social integration did not. Moreover, there even
emerged negative perceptions and tensions. There are ceveral reasons for the negative
picture of the immigrants for neighbouring Central American countries. First of all, they
are blamed for taking the jobs of Belizeans, since they work for lower wages than the
official wages (Roessingh, 2001, p. 21). Besides, that, since the Central American
immigrants came in with such great numbers, the whole ethnic proportions in Belize
have changed. This is one of the reasons that they are disliked, which might be an
understatement, since they are called “Aliens” in the language of the people. Yet another
consequence is that nowadays only 54.3 percent of the population speaks proper English
and 45.7 percent spreaks it badly or not. Moreover, 43.8 percent of the population speaks
proper Spanish (Roessingh, 2001, p. 44).
Economic situation
Belize is not a very rich country and natural resources are scarce. In spite of this, its
economic position is quite favourable in comparison to other countries in the region such
as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Popma and Van Spijk, 2008). The
country had to deal with many economic setbacks once it had acquired independence. In
this period (the eighties), Belize’s export consisted mainly of products from the agricultural
industry, such as sugar, molasses, citrus fruits, and bananas. Owing to high oil prices, low
sugar prices, and a declining world market, the country was on the verge of bankruptcy
in 1981 (Barry, 1995, p. 39). Recently, Belize depends largely on the economic situation
in the USA. Much of the agricultural produce is exported to the USA (Barry, 1995). Owing
to the fact that the Belizean dollar is linked to the US dollar, the current economic set back
in the USA hits Belize hard, making it economically very fragile.
Independent Belize is a typical example of a developing country facing the challenges
of post-colonialism, immigration flows, and multiculturalism. Belize is linked to the
world through the media, is influenced by strong transnational movements and ideas
such as environmentalism, liberalisation of the economy, democracy, international
tourism (Berendse and Roessingh, 2007; Roessingh et al., 2008; Sutherland, 1998).
Problems caused by unemployment, the political, and economical marginal role the
country has in the region, the everlasting conflict over land with Guatemala and the fact
that Belize is a young, independent country makes it necessary for the two dominating
government parties United Democratic Party (UDP) and People’s United Party (PUP)[2]
to deal with these challenges. In doing so, both government parties have tried to
establish and strengthen the promotion of contributions to national development
(Medina, 1997, p. 152).
In their policies, investors are considered to be the most significant contributors to
national economic development. Therefore, the government has worked to establish
an “attractive climate for investment” for international investors (Medina, 1997). Not
surprisingly, due to these policies, the Belizean development rhetoric has largely been
shaped by the intervention of external donors. International lending institutions such as
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund coercively enforced their definitions
of development on the Government of Belize (GOB). Instead of concentrating on
producing products for domestic markets, Belize was reinforced to primarily focus on
investments in export production ((The) World Bank, 1984).
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However, development discourse in Belize cannot only be characterized by coercion
applied by the more powerful players. There also exists an actual belief in international
models and definitions of development (Medina, 2004, p. 47). The two ruling parties truly
believe that through intervention, their nation’s trade deficit will decrease and that foreign
currency will be earned in order to repay the creditors financing this development
strategy. Having adopted this export-led development strategy, the GOB has encouraged
(foreign) investment by offering tax and tariff concessions. Belizean citizens were also
recommended to seek benefits from the economic development process by investing in the
export of agricultural products (Moberg, 1992). Although the Belizean economy is
considered successful in the region, current unemployment is estimated at 20 percent,
wages lag behind the cost of living and an estimated 33 percent of the population lives in
poverty (CIA World Factbook, 2005). Nevertheless, the GOB still draws on emerging
transnational discourses that prescibe economic development as the way to eliminate
poverty (Shoman, 1994). Against this background Belize recently established diplomatic
ties with a relatively new player in the development field, Taiwan.
As stated before, Taiwan argues that, due to comparable backgrounds, their
South-South development projects are better applicable than North-South development
projects. However, although there might be some similarities in the historical
backgrounds of these countries, the differences predominate. Hence, Taiwan’s colonizers
actually contributed to Taiwan’s current success. For instance, Taiwan inherited from
the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945) the basic institutional structures. In addition,
Taiwan’s nationalist government received significant international assistance which
contributed to the funding of Taiwan’s transformation in terms of social infrastructure.
Moreover, Taiwan also had strong neighbourhood effects, such as pressure from China
to develop and technology transfers from other East Asian countries that initiated their
growth process. These are only a few examples of the differences between Taiwan and
Belize[3]. When taking all the historical, geographical, political, and cultural differences
between Taiwan and Belize into account, serious questions can be raised about whether
the “Taiwan experience” can be transferred to a country like Belize. For a better
understanding of Taiwan as a foreign development donor in the Belizean context, it is
necessary to first shed light on this emerging Taiwanese development organization.
Taiwan’s development organization
Surprisingly, little is known about Taiwan’s ICDF and its role as a donor is often overlooked.
This ignorance can largely be explained by the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan (Baker and
Edmonds, 2004). After exclusion from the UN in 1971, many countries turned their back on
Taiwan, which then experienced a drastic decline in receiving international recognition. As a
result, little interest has been shown in ICDF’s whereabouts. When it comes to its economic
success and political reforms, however, Taiwan did receive much international attention
(Yang, 1997, p. 6). Not only has the island occasionally been ranked number one in the world
when it comes to its production capacity, it also experienced a peaceful and rapid transition
to democracy (Huang, 1993, p. 43). This disparity which is based on Taiwan’s political and
historical events, specifically its relationship with mainland China, has made that Taiwan is
currently diplomatically poor but financially rich.
Taiwan’s agricultural sector was the cornerstone in contributing to the fundaments
of this richness (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2002). Gradually, the Taiwanese economy went from
exporting agricultural processed goods, to the production of low technology
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manufactured goods, and is now producing high technology manufactured goods. It was
this sector that directed the islands transformation from virtual poverty to a modern rich
industrial nation (Baker and Edmonds, 2004, p. 189). With this success, Taiwan presents
itself as an example of going from a traditional agricultural society (Huang, 1993) to a
country with one of the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves. As many developing
countries also heavily rely on the agricultural sector, they are hoping on a similar
success story. Taiwan therefore uses this comparable situation to justify the agricultural
dominance in their development projects. Techniques and knowledge that were once
important in Taiwan’s development are now being transferred to development countries
in the form of technical assistance projects.
Taiwan’s development assistance started as early as 1961, under “Operation
Vanguard”. Their first agricultural technical missions took place in newly independent
African countries to help improve fruit and vegetable production (Chan, 1997, p. 4).
These missions were expanded to later become the “ROC-Africa Technical Cooperation
Committee”. Africa remained the main recipient of Taiwan’s technical assistance,
among some other newly independent countries, until 1971. After that, when Taiwan
lost its UN seat, the focus was strategically changed from Africa to South America.
In 1989, under the supervision of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Overseas
(later renamed “International”) Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF) was
established.
From that time on the IECDF was responsible of providing economic and social
assistance to what they considered “friendly and allied” developing nations (ICDF, 2003,
p. 4). A country was considered friendly or allied when it would establish diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. Even a country that does not have diplomatic relations with
Taiwan can also be considered friendly (Chan, 1997, p. 45). Obviously, the grounds on
which a country is considered friendly or allied are subjective and change over time,
depending on the estimated potential of a country.
As the variety and number of development projects expanded the government
consolidated the IECDF, together with the Committee of International Technical
Cooperation, into an independent organization in 1996: the ICDF (Taiwan). Currently,
the ICDF is responsible for all development assistance from Taiwan. Its tasks are to
maintain but also to expand Taiwan’s diplomatic position, in order to prevent the island
from becoming further isolated. Quite unique is that the ICDF is coordinated among
several government agencies[4]. Many of these representatives declare that Taiwan
offers development assistance because it has become relatively wealthy and should
share this experience.
This way of internationalizing of Taiwan’s economy has the positive “side effect” of
enhancing its trade and investment opportunities. More importantly, this aid-giving
policy helps to polish Taiwan’s international weakened image (Chan, 1997, p. 39). The
prevalence of ICDF’s political and economic motives also appear from the fact that
Taiwan mainly offers development assistance to “friendly” countries from which it
receives diplomatic recognition and support for readmission to the UN. This distincts
Taiwan from most other southern donors who at least pretend that their development
projects are an act of solidarity. In fact, diplomatic support became an explicitly defined
requisite for countries to receive development assistance from Taiwan. Hence, Taiwan’s
political and economic motives carry more weight than the solidarity with their southern
counterparts. Ultimately, Taiwan wants to use their development programs in order to
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increase their chance to be regarded as a full-fledged nation rather than a province of
mainland China.
Once a recipient country accepts their conditions, it can receive assistance in three
separated categories of development projects:
(1) technical cooperation;
(2) grants and relief; and
(3) loans.
The more recent initiatives (from 1998 on) also include projects for small and medium
enterprises, micro credit and volunteer programs. However, the transfer of agricultural
technology still constitutes the core of Taiwan’s technical programs (ICDF, 2003).
As Taiwan’s selection of countries was limited, they turned to developing countries in
Africa, the Pacific and Central America. Mainly as a consequence of their development
projects, nowadays 32 countries formally recognize Taiwan. Most of these countries,
however, are small and poor and therefore minor players in international politics (Chan,
1997). In the next section, we will discuss the way in which the South-South cooperation
between Taiwan and Belize came about.
ICDF – Taiwan in Belize
It was not until the beginning of 1989 that diplomatic relations were established between
Belize, under the former PUP administration and Taiwan (Popma, 2006). The realization
of political ties between Belize and Taiwan was a reflection of both their foreign policies.
Belize wanted to attract foreign capital by opening up its economy in order to advance
the growth potential of its agricultural- and export-based economy (Inter-American
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), 1995, p. xxix). To fully exploit this
source of development, the government wanted to explore new market opportunities by
establishing linkages with experienced technicians. Simultaneously, Taiwan’s efforts of
receiving international recognition consisted of transferring their own core technology
to other countries by sending them experienced technicians (Pickles and Woods, 1989).
Belize was thereby selected as an appropriate location of sending these technical
specialists (ICDF, 2003). As their relations evolved, the President of Taiwan Mr Chen
Shui-bian even reassured Belize that:
It is my firm belief that the relations between our two countries will continue to strengthen
and grow to our mutual benefit. I look forward to our continued friendship and cooperation
(Belize-Taiwan Bulletin, 2003).
Although rhetoric like this is quite common among diplomats, the Taiwanese president
actually backed up his words with continued high-level state visits, numerous
donations, aid, and loans (Belize-Taiwan Bulletin, 2003). This “friendship” was made
even more concrete by academic exchange programs for Belizean students, cultural
exchanges, and training courses for Belizean government officials, which were mostly
held in Taiwan. Even the Prime Minister of Belize, Mr Musa, has been invited to make
field trips to Taiwan in order to facilitate the transfer of the “Taiwan experience” (Chan,
1997). This high degree of attention reflects Taiwan’s concern to win, but also maintain,
diplomatic recognition from a developing country like Belize.
In starting its technical mission in Belize ICDF worked closely with the Ministry of
Agriculture in order to assist in implementing projects. According to the ICDF the main
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focus of the projects in Belize must be on import substitution. By enhancing the
competitive advantage of products in domestic and regional markets “we [ICDF] aim at
contributing to agricultural diversification and introducing new possibilities of value
adding, by using local Belizean materials”. The whole team of the Taiwanese mission in
Belize currently comprises six members, including a chief, two agronomists,
a horticulturist, a food processing specialist, and a mechanic.
When asking about the limited number of Taiwanese experts, ICDF explained that
it has proven difficult to send enough manpower that possessed sufficient technical
qualifications. They indicated that this is due to the Taiwanese government budget
limitations and the difficulty of recruiting qualified personnel to work overseas.
Nevertheless, they were proud to say that these six people are now carrying out three
different projects in Belize. Centred on the following areas:
(1) Rice seed development and technology transfer project. Within this project rice
seed production technology is transferred. Production systems are established
and guidance is provided to what ICDF calls “outstanding” farmers and local
technicians.
(2) Vegetable and crop production improvement and extension project. The aim of
this project is to provide farmers with production techniques for planting
market-oriented crops so that vegetable imports can be decreased. The intended
aim is to lessen foreign exchange outflows and facilitate the development of
multidirectional trade.
(3) Food processing project. This project aims to diversify the Belizean agricultural
industry by developing value added products through food processing. The
objective is to produce goods with market potential, processed from Belize’s
existing agricultural raw materials. For instance, products like dried papaya
and dried mango were introduced. The ICDF is promoting diversification in
order to gradually reduce Belize’s dependence on imports.
Besides, these main areas, the technical mission also implemented investment and
lending projects. For instance, the “Small farmholder-financing scheme” was initiated to
provide soft loans and funding for farmers to purchase supplies and farming machines.
Nevertheless, the focus of the Taiwanese projects is aimed at “teaching the Taiwan
experience” (ICDF, 2003). This emphasis on teaching rather than giving is also stated in
an old Taiwanese proverb “give a man a fish and he eats for a day. Teach a man how to
fish and he eats for a lifetime”. To see how this philosophy works out in practice the next
section takes a closer look at the fate of the Taiwanese development project in Belize by
looking at the perceived impact of the project within the Belizean community. First, we
will turn to the methodology of the study.
Local responses towards ICDF in Belize
On the road to Central Farm, several large signs welcome visitors in Taiwanese.
Suddenly, in the middle of nowhere one can see neat rows of different, sometimes
unfamiliar, vegetable and fruit crops. When looking closer, it looks like patches of rural
Taiwan have been transplanted into the Belizean landscape. On these patches of land,
there are hard working Taiwanese farmers with their faces hidden under Taiwanese
straw hats. Once arriving at the farm, a large Taiwanese flag awaits visitors at the
entrance. These signs not only proclaim the transnational character of the farm; it also
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testifies of the Taiwanese dominance. This is Central Farm, an agricultural research
centre, the central base of the Taiwanese development project and its workers who
settled here after the diplomatic links between Belize and Taiwan were established.
As stated before, the impact of the transplanting of Taiwanese techniques depends on
their relationship with their Belizean counterparts. Therefore, in this section, the
perceptions of different actors toward the ICDF project in Belize will be described.
Case 1: Belmopan, government responses
When the Taiwanese development workers attempt to promote agricultural
development they do so within a particular institutional context. The context that is
referred to here is the GOB and its rules governing the introduction and diffusion of the
new technologies. In this case study, the focus will be on the perceptions of the Belizean
authorities concerning the Taiwanese practices. Belmopan is the capital of Belize. Even
though this town is called “Garden City” this is the place where all government officials
are located. Although the GOB functions through its several ministries, the Ministry of
Agriculture has the principal responsibility for agricultural development and thus for
the ICDF projects. However, several other ministries, such as the Ministry of National
Development and Foreign Affairs, are also involved.
Agriculture, in Belize, has provided as much as 20-30 percent of GDP and
approximately 23 percent of national employment (Central Intelligence Agency 2004 est.)
More than three-quarters of its export earnings come from farm products. There are,
however, also some serious constrains. Domestic foods supplies depend to a large extend
on imports; food accounts for more than one-quarter of Belize’s import bill.
Major agricultural development goals of the GOB are therefore an expansion of
exports, greater domestic food production, import substitution and “a higher standard
of living for all people in the agricultural sector” (Ministry of Agriculture, 1988). The
Belizean government consistently supported agriculture as being the economic
mainstay of the country. The lack of a well trained manpower in forestry, agribusiness
and agricultural sciences limits the government’s ability, as well as the private sector, to
fully support agricultural development activities. Therefore, the GOB warmly welcomes
initiatives as those brought by the Taiwanese of supporting agricultural innovations.
Against this background is not surprising that the Taiwanese agricultural mission
was deemed a success. Without any exception, the six government officials[5]
participating in this research, were all positive about the Taiwanese development
project. Apparently, an important factor in bringing about these positive perceptions
of the ICDF project was the Taiwanese willingness to closely cooperate with the GOB.
All Taiwanese projects were officially linked with the Ministry of Agriculture. In fact,
the Taiwanese approached all the relevant ministries on the project area in “getting
things done”. Yet, when questioning officials further about the exact contents and status
of ICDF’s projects there was frequently referred to the ICDF itself. It became apparent
that the GOB was mainly taking on an accommodating role towards the Taiwanese,
instead of being critically informed towards their projects. Indeed, some officials
acknowledged that one of the dilemma’s facing the ministry administrators was the
adequate serving of this outside donor project. Clearly, the GOB had trouble combining
that task with carrying out a full-fledged program with an already limited staff. Giving
the current mode of operations of the Ministry of Agriculture being “understaffed, under
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trained and underfinanced” they stated not being able to meet the requirements for
ICDF’s call for Belizean counterparts.
This limited ability of the GOB to control and cooperate with the Taiwanese, brought
about a high degree of autonomy for the ICDF project decisions. Consequently, the
Taiwanese could implement their policies with ease, without any government
constrains or conditions. In many cases, the Taiwanese formed stronger project linkages
with institutions in their home country than with local government institutions. Many
reports and results were therefore not translated into English for the GOB. Some of the
officials complained about the unwillingness of their southern donor to provide
information or reports about their activities. Nevertheless, due to this “shortcoming” the
government officials said to be most willing to facilitate the Taiwanese in their work.
One of the ways in which the GOB had chosen to support the Taiwanese was through
promoting Taiwanese food samples at agricultural fairs. The Taiwanese also did their
part in maintaining their prominent, comfortable position by keeping up their
“friendship” with the Belizean authorities. The various ministries have been continually
receiving grants, vehicles, computers, and so on.
The officials considered this “dollar diplomacy”, as the Minister of Agriculture[6]
called the Taiwanese project, very beneficial to the country. This generally positive
perceptions seemed to be related to the positive public attention towards the
development program due to all the grants and gifts. For instance, one minister
mentioned that the Taiwanese supported the modernization of Belize’s Foreign Affairs
ministry by donating the government BZ$45,57,788.00. After receiving all this help and
assistance from the Taiwanese, the Belizean government wanted to do something
substantive in return. Instead of being able to provide adequate Belizean counterparts
for the ICDF project, the GOB put their focus on facilitating the need of the Taiwanese.
As one official expressed, “participating in the process of national development as the
Taiwanese do, should be facilitated by the state’s provision of resources”. Accordingly,
the Belizean government provided land, houses, and resources for the Taiwanese
development workers. More significantly, they relaxed travel restrictions for all
Taiwanese people; they revised immigration laws relating to visas, residence permits,
and even passports. Some officials stated that these measures were also aimed at
attracting and facilitating more Taiwanese investment into Belize.
In addition to this, the UDP instituted the “Economic Citizenship Program”. This
program was designed to attract foreign investment to the country. This program meant
that if a family or institution would invest more than BZ$50,000 in Belize, they would in
turn receive passports and enjoy full citizenship status (Medina, 1997, p. 152). This
program was unanimously supported by both political parties. Even though this
program provoked quite some resistance it was (re)opened from 1989 to 1994. So, upon
the establishment of diplomatic ties and the IDCF development project in 1989, there has
been a rapid increase of Taiwanese immigrants in Belize. Within a relatively short time
Belize became a node in worldwide Taiwanese diasporas (Sutherland, 1998). The
negative side to all this friendliness was that the officials felt that there emerged certain
distrust on the part of the Belizean citizens. For the Belizean government was often
accused of “corrupt” practices and for “filling their own pockets”. Not suprisingly, of the
estimated US$23 million raised during that five year period, it appears that none found
its way to the public treasury. Consequently, the purchase of citizenship in general and
by the Taiwanese in specific became a nationwide controversial issue. The political
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parties of Belize have been blamed for “selling” citizenship to Taiwanese in order to fill
their own pockets. An article in Belize First Magazine (1995) illustrates this controversy:
LATEST SCANDAL: TAIWANESE INVADE BELIZE
[. . .] Following the resignation of Minister of Human Resources and the firing of two senior
officers in the department in June, figures have been flying on the number of new residency
permits issued to Taiwanese and others, both under the current UDP and former PUP
regimes. Almost 17,000 individuals, a majority of them from Taiwan, have been granted
permanent residency in Belize since 1989. In many cases, the recipients of these residency
cards reportedly have never visited Belize. To help clean up the mess, the government has
transferred the Immigration and Nationality Department to the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
The Taiwanese migrant population’s easy access to land, resources and job opportunities
has made them a constant and growing target for the local population’s hostility and
rejection. Many Belizeans, including even some government officials, often refer to the
Taiwanese as “Aliens” or “invaders”. The Taiwanese are often pictured as people who
buy land and passports but keep away from the locals. As Palacio (1990) argues in his
critical review of Belize, that there is a not visible anti-immigrant sentiment being
cultivated in Belize. Ethnic relations nor the continuous patterns of immigration and
emigration do not only shape these tensions. More importantly, these problems are
caused by the nature of the economy of the country, which is open, dependent and under
control by foreigners.
Some of the respondents said they are now being accused of equating the concerns of
investors, in this case the Taiwanese, with the interest of the nation as a whole. Owing to
all this criticism it appeared that the eager embrace of the Taiwanese by the GOB stood
in sharp contrast to more mainstream views of Belizean citizens. The government now
fears the risk that ICDF’s tasks will be undermined, which is in fact local development.
Although most officials hailed the ICDF project as being a major success, they also have
the feeling they should be more reserved towards the Taiwanese. In reaction to the
negative publicity, these days the Taiwanese are treated the same way or even more
strict, as any other foreigner coming to Belize. In fact, despite Taiwan’s Government’s
$100 million loan to Belize, and its subsequent $4 million grant to Belize, Taiwanese
applicants are no longer given a break. Currently, the Economic Citizenship Program no
longer exists and the Taiwanese now have to pay a $3,000 fee for residence applications.
While fees are refundable for other nationals, they are not for the Taiwanese. By
implementing these measures the government is hoping to recover the trust of its
citizens regarding the Taiwanese. The next section demonstrates just how deeply
domestic politics influences the perceptions of its citizens.
Case 2: Cayo district, farmer and non-farmer responses
The agricultural project of the Taiwanese involves the transfer of agricultural techniques
and information to farmers. Obviously, the adoption of new techniques by Belizean
farmers will not go automatically. Acceptance of new technology depends on the way it is
perceived by farmers but also by the wider society (Marsden and Oakley, 1990, p. 18).
In this section, we will look how these ideas and technologies took root in the Cayo district
of Belize where the ICDF at Central Farm is located.
Cayo is a multicultural, predominantly agricultural district, located in the western part of
Belize. The various ethnic groups, such as the Mayan Indians, the Garifuna, Creoles, Mestizo,
and Mennonites, all left their traces in the agricultural farming systems applied in this area
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(IICA, 1995). For instance, many Mayan, Mestizo, and Creole households practice “milpa”
farming, which consists of the basic slash and burn preparation and planting, primarily for
subsistence family food consumption. A transitional cropping pattern called “mixed
farming” is also found in this district, mostly among the Maya and Mestizo farmers.
More diversified crops, some mechanization and other uses of capital inputs
characterize these farms. Next to citrus growers, estate agriculture[7] and livestock farms,
are significant types of farming in this district which is practiced by the “integrated
communities”. These are comprised of the Mennonite farmers who practice integrated,
diversified, and mechanized agriculture (Roessingh, 2001). They have a strong impact on
the production of items like grains, chicken, eggs, and dairy products all over Belize.
While there seems to be much potential in additional jobs in agriculture in the Cayo
district, many people here are no longer attracted to farming. In fact, there are many
complaints about local labour shortages in the rural sector at harvest time. In addition,
even though the Belize School of Agriculture is located in this district to educate
agriculturalists, the number of experts is limited.
The respondents chosen to participate in the discussions are therefore both, farmers
as well as non-farmers. As starting point for each discussion both the farmers and
non-farmers were asked about the impact of the presence of ICDF on their lives. Both the
positive and the negative consequences have been discussed and further elaborated.
The responses of farmers and non-farmers towards the ICDF project were quite
diverse. Unexpectedly, the non-farmers perceived the agricultural development project
as more positive than the farmers did. The non-farmers were sharing the opinion that
Belize benefits from the development project in that the country receives “a lot of aid”. In
order to try and confirm the non-farmers positive claims, concrete personal examples
were asked for. It soon became clear when asking specifically for examples of (personal)
benefits, the respondents found it hard to give any. Some respondents referred to the
renovation of the Garifuna Museum that was funded by the ICDF. Others mentioned the
introduction of new vegetables such as cauliflower. Evidently, there existed a clear lack
of information among the non-farmers about the ICDF’s whereabouts. In fact, most
non-farmers were not really aware of what the Taiwanese at Central Farm were exactly
doing. Despite this lack of information on the projects, there was a general support for
the ICDF presence among the non-farmer respondents.
There were, however, also some negative points addressed by the non-farmers. They
resented the fact that the Taiwanese isolated their development personnel away from
Belizean social life. Indeed, all of the development workers resided at Central Farm, which
lies quite isolated from the wider society and removed from social life in the Cayo district.
One of the respondents commented; “they hardly mingle with local people [. . .] They even
put their children away into private schools”. After confronting, Mr Chen, the chief of the
project with these resentments, he admitted to put his children to a private school. He
stated that his choice for a private school had to do with the quality of the education.
The farmers, on the contrary, were in general more sceptical towards the agricultural
development projects. All of the farmers had been farming long before the Taiwanese
Agricultural Mission arrived. The Taiwanese introduced specific methods of land
management, where farmers have to operate their land as a business rather than a
supplement to domestic food supply (ICDF, 2005). Consequently, some farmers were never
interested in the new techniques brought by the Taiwanese to begin with. They only
produced for home consumption and did have any intentions to change that in the future.
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In addition, there were also farmers who regarded the Taiwanese who came to
demonstrate new techniques as “Chinaman farmers”[8] rather than as foreign technical
workers. They perceived the Taiwanese technical workers more as competitors than as
foreign experts. Obviously, this was due to a lack of information about the practices of the
ICDF projects.
Diversification and soil management, examples of techniques that significantly
contributed to Taiwan’s agricultural development, were important elements in ICDF’s
projects. These techniques were also introduced in Cayo, where farmers had been
advised to diversify their activities. This was considered an important element in the
development project and was generally perceived positively among farmers. Many
improved varieties of already familiar crops such as tomato and papaya were very
popular among the participating farmers. They found that the quality and
attractiveness of the fruits and vegetables had improved. It became clear that these
positive claims were influenced by growing market demand and thus profitability on
behalf of the farmers.
The Taiwanese development workers also introduced crops that were unfamiliar to
the farmers. The farmers’ responses to these new crops were less positive. Farmers in
Cayo saw no reason in producing “alien” or Taiwanese products. Again, their preference
was clearly influenced by the demand of the Belizean people. Many Belizeans did not buy
products unfamiliar to them. One farmer stated that these Taiwanese products, like
Chinese cabbage, were mainly meant for the “Taiwanese people”. On the other hand,
some Taiwanese products were embraced by Belizean consumers such as the newly
introduced guava, and thus also by the farmers. There was thus a clear link noticable
between positive perceptions on behalf of the farmers and profit.
Farmers who participated in the development program noticed that their production
had increased, making their farming practices more profitable. The main explanation
for this was that the technical mission introduced new farming techniques which
enabled higher yields. For instance, the farmers were able to produce more vegetables
“off-season”. Some farmers cited the introduction of new seeds as the main reason in
that they could produce more diverse crops in a shorter time.
However, there was also a down side to this, besides introducing new techniques the
Taiwanese were also notorious for introducing “many, many rules”. Hence, the use of new
techniques and seed development required intensive training. Farmers who participated
in the project were to keep themselves to “strict rules on attendance, hard work,
participation and leadership” (ICDF, 2005). These rules were introduced to coordinate the
farmers’ efforts and increase production, productivity, and market potential.
Not all participating farmers followed these rules as closely as the Taiwanese would
have liked. While some farmers acknowledged the purpose of the rules, others took it as
an insult. One farmer commented that “they think we are stupid and lazy and that is why
they want to tell us all their rules”. One discussion evidenced a tendency of paternalism;
some accused the Taiwanese to consider themselves as “superior” in relation to the
farmers. Moreover, the farmers stated that the project workers acted as if the Belizean
development problem is a matter of “lack of knowledge” on behalf of the farmers. The
project workers are said to consider themselves as agents of knowledge and believe that
it is the task of the project to convince the farmers to “improve” agricultural practices.
The farmers partly acknowledge that there is a “shortage” of knowledge indeed,
however, they also blame this on their “lack of resources”. Thus, although most farmers
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agreed that the techniques introduced by the Taiwanese were useful, these perceived
problems were mainly a result of the (lack of) communication between the Taiwanese
and the farmers, this is considered below in some detail.
Communication
As the technical missions mainly consisted of the transfer of skills and knowledge,
communication between the (non-) farmers and the Taiwanese was inevitable. In addition,
open communication increases the opportunity for effective transfer of skills and
practices, which improves learning (Bra¨utigam, 1998, p. 169). In order to accomplish an
actual transfer of knowledge, the Taiwanese had to make themselves and their projects
known under the Belizean population. Second, they had to communicate with the Belizean
farmers who decided to participate in their projects. When it came to the marketing (or
selling) of the ICDF technical mission, it became clear that the Taiwanese had not yet
succeeded. Both, farmers and non-farmers, had trouble describing what the Taiwanese
projects consisted of. In fact, many Belizeans acknowledged even having some difficulty
figuring out what it exactly is the Taiwanese are doing. For instance, a number of
respondents perceived the Central Farm as being a governmental training or teaching
centre. Others, on the contrary, considered it as place that sells fresh fruits and vegetables.
While most agreed that Central Farm was the place were the ICDF was located, much
vagueness existed on their exact whereabouts. This suggest a lack of communication on
the side of ICDF about the contents, aims and possibilities of their programs.
As for the participating farmers, the communication aspect appeared to be even
more troubling. Even though not all respondents acknowledged having communication
problems with their Taiwanese counterparts most of them did, one way or the other.
Most farmers cited that they find it almost impossible to communicate with the
Taiwanese for “them people hardly speak any English or Spanish”.
Indeed, the Taiwanese workers confirmed having trouble to communicate with local
people. The project teams therefore saw few opportunities to actually transfer the
knowledge they had. That is why they started to give demonstrations. A few farmers
were a bit sceptical about this approach as one commented; “It is impossible to teach
somebody, if you cannot talk to the person”. A few farmers did not consider this a
problem. They, on the contrary, stated to be impressed by the fact that the Taiwanese
were willing to “get their hands dirty”. According to these farmers, they learned more by
watching then by listening.
Consequences
As a consequence, of this limited dialogue the farmers often stated they perceived the
Taiwanese development workers as secretive: “with them you never know if they mean
what they say because they always smile at you”. These perceptions of secretiveness
extended to the farmers becoming suspicious towards the Taiwanese good intentions.
This questioning of the true developmental intentions of the Taiwanese was reinforced
by the fact that they worked closely with the Belizean government. One farmer
commented “anyone who works with our government is not to be trusted”.
Consequently, farmers doubted the Taiwanese accountability. For some farmers it
was already clear that the Taiwanese were only in Belize “for their own good”. Their
easy access to land and resources were enough prove for them. Others mentioned the fact
that the Taiwanese isolated their personnel from Belizean social life as evidence of their
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self-interest. One farmer even accused the Taiwanese of wanting to “take over Belize”.
He referred to a Taiwanese- Belizean, named Ralph Huang, who was running for
candidate in the Cayo north-east convention at that time.
These negative images of the Taiwanese suggest that the ICDF workers were not really
concerned with, or at least not working on their image. However, the perceptions of secrecy
were probably more the result of the communication problems and lack of information
sharing. The Taiwanese development workers never realized that their behaviour had
such an effect on the Belizeans. Even though many farmers were convinced that the
Taiwanese were secretive, some farmers gave them the benefit of the doubt. They
interpreted the reserved behaviour of the Taiwanese as “being polite” and “part of their
culture”. Thus, in general the farmers were positive about newly introduced techniques,
however, they strongly resented the poor communication skills of the Taiwanese. Owing
to this they started to doubt the Taiwanese development projects’ accountability. In the
light of the difficulties the farmers were having in communication, more problems arose.
One of the main problems will be considered below.
Loans
A lot of the machinery that the Taiwanese introduced in terms of their agricultural
project was unaffordable for the average Belizean farmer. In addition, farmers who
participated in the ICDF projects were faced with having to procure their own seed,
fertilizer and more. Financial resources, so critical to invest and buy the proper
machinery, were available to only some of the farmers. Many investments in agriculture
had to be financed by the farmer himself.
Although there are some Belizean banks in the rural financial market, they are
sceptical towards providing loans to rural people. Many lenders resist lending to
farmers because agricultural prices, incomes, and thus repayment capacities are not
secured. In the light of this problem ICDF provided loans to farmers in order to
improve their business activities, increase employment, and reduce poverty (ICDF,
2005). This aspect of the project, however, has become a major concern for both the
farmers and the technical mission.
Owing to the lack of information provided on behalf of the Taiwanese, many farmers
found themselves not able or willing to pay back the loans. One farmer mentioned that
this confusion was due obscurity of the loan agreement. Even though the loan agreement
was brief, about two pages, it was considered too formal with a lot of jargon. The
agreement stated the amount of the loan, the time of period over which the loan could be
used and, not unimportant, the repayment procedures.
Indeed, the document could have been written in a less formal way, however, it also
appeared that the documents were not well read by Belizean farmers. This was probably
the main cause of all the misunderstandings. Perhaps, not surprising, many farmers
reported that they considered the ICDF as an extension of the government. As one
farmer stated:
[. . .] when we borrow from the government, who is not to be trusted anyway, we will not
consider paying back our debts as urgent. They steal from us we steal from them.
The fact that the ICDF has worked so closely with the GOB has proven to be a serious
threat to their overall accountability. In a country like Belize where the government is
notorious for patronage practices and “filling their own pockets” there already exists a
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certain distrust. In working closely with the GOB, the ICDF might have been sending the
wrong intentions to the Belizean people. Moreover, since they also kept themselves away
from the average Belizean, it is not really suprising that a certain degree of distrust
emerged.
As this is an ongoing project the solution to this problem has not yet been presented.
What is known, however, is that the Taiwanese realized that the communication aspect
of their mission needed improvement. So, in trying to get the farmers to start paying
back their loans, the Taiwanese went to pay them personal visits. During these visits
they tried to convince the farmers that ICDF is not a government institution but an
independent development agency. They tell the farmers that since they are a
development agency the interest rates of the loans are relatively low. In order to be able
to take advantage of these low interest rates, farmers are persuaded to pay back their
debts soon in order to avoid the rates to rise.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the Taiwanese development project of ICDF in Belize. In doing
so, this study has examined a significant but overlooked chapter in the development
literature. An effort was made to verify whether this South-South project had
characteristics that made it appropriate to developing country conditions. This was
done by offering more insights into the Taiwanese development organization in general
and the development projects in Belize in specific. To give an answer to the central
question of what the social impact of the ICDF project in Belize was, we now turn to a
critical appraisal of this South-South development effort.
After visiting Taiwan’s project sites in Belize and interviewing government officials,
Taiwanese-Belizeans, Belizean farmers, and non-farmers, it was found that much of
what the Taiwanese brought was indeed considered beneficial, although incomplete.
The links between the technical mission and wider society were not well developed, yet
not least because of the difficulties in communicating with the Taiwanese development
workers (because of their lack of English proviciency). It would be wrong to suggest,
however, that Taiwan’s development project was only perceived as raising problems for
it did have a positive impact.
Taiwan brought to Belize a set of technologies and practices primarily intended to
promote diversification and increase production to substitute imported goods. In doing
so the Taiwanese brought about a significant variation in the agricultural products
available on Belizean markets. They introduced to the Belizean people new seeds, fruits,
and vegetables. These innovations introduced by the Taiwanese were clearly an attempt
to apply their own rural “Taiwan experiences” to Belize. Moreover, the Belizeans
perceived the new technology that their southern counterpart introduced, positively.
Many respondents reacted enthusiastically when they were asked about the Taiwanese
development projects. In this sense, it can be concluded that the Taiwanese introduced
technologies that were suitable for the Belizean environment.
Yet when digging deeper it appeared that many Belizeans shared the opinion that the
impact of the Taiwanese project largely remained foreign or “alien” in that it remained
distant from Belizean society. The Taiwanese showed little awareness in the
significance of adapting to local conditions. It appeared that the Taiwanese failed to
include essential aspects that have been identified as crucial to the local acceptance of
development programs. Hence, they had the tendency to ignore the influence of domestic
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considerations such as language barriers or cultural differences. In doing so, they
overlooked the context in which the projects had to be implemented.
In particular, they ignored the larger social picture that affected the projects’
implementation and acceptation. This hindered the actual transfer of their technology,
as it seemed very difficult to bring into practice.
As a consequence, much of the technology never actually reached Belizean farmers.
Although it is often claimed that development assistance from the south is more suitable to
the south, this specific project did not fully show evidence in favour of this advantage.
Clearly, contextual, human factors influence the implementation and course of a project; this
was certainly the case for Taiwan’s project in Belize. Why then, did the Taiwanese handicap
their projects impact by acting on the basis of insufficient knowledge of local practices?
The answer to this question can be traced to at least two factors: the first important
factor restricting the positive impact of the ICDF was their one-sided focus. The
Taiwanese regarded their work as purely technical; they mainly focussed on their
agricultural technical tasks and products. This gave the impression that they were
disinterested, neutral carriers of technical knowledge, who disregarded the ideas and
assumptions of the wider society.
Furthermore, within this specific southern development project there was little
awareness of the significance of providing appropriate technologies, nor of the
possibility of adapting project techniques to enhance local employment and training.
Moreover, the fact that some Taiwanese development workers could hardly speak
English or Spanish and dissociated themselves from Belizean life, shaped the contents
as well as the reach of the project.
This again enforces the premise that alienation from wider society has a negative side
effect. In fact, many of the negative perceptions of respondents came down to this
narrow technical focus. Against this background it can be stated that the technical
aspect of development workers in a foreign country is probably just as important as the
social aspect. For an actual transfer of technology to take place, cooperation and
communication between the sender and the receiver is required. Hence, accurate
information sharing and role clarification about what the Taiwanese had to offer may
be an essential task for the ICDF in the future. A part of a possible solution would also be
to incorporate a better awareness of the local Belizean culture into the design and
implementation of the Taiwanese development intervention. One way to do this is by
involving local (farmers-) knowledge in the decision-making process rather than
imposing on them a certain view. For, as the preceding cases illustrated, Belizeans have
their own opinions about development in their country.
The second restriction to the positive impact of the ICDF had to do with the political
objectives of the Taiwanese assistance. In Taiwan the commitment of the government to
agricultural development has been a notable feature of its economic success.
The Taiwanese were hoping on a similar devotion of the Belizean government.
Although the commitment of the Belizean government was there on paper, they actually
lacked the ability to assign adequate counterparts. Evidently, the Taiwanese introduced
institutional demanding agricultural innovations into an environment with relatively
weak institutions. It became clear that Belizean government officials had trouble with
the process of establishing beneficial linkages to the farmers. Ultimately, Taiwan’s
imported development ideology required not only acceptance at the highest political
levels but also at the local “grassroots” level.
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Furthermore, it appeared that the assistance from Taiwan was provided to obtain
immediate political objectives; receiving international recognition. This explains why
the Taiwanese were mainly interested in cooperation at the government level. These
non-developmental motives influenced the development impact adversely.
This point touches the delicate subject of the role of the government in development
projects. Indeed, decisions of development organizations to cooperate with government
institutions can be positive, but not if the recourses never “trickle down” and add to local
capacity building. So, until the GOB provides an “enabling environment”[9] for its
citizens, the promise of the “Taiwan experience” is likely to remain untapped. Until then,
it is strongly recommended that the future cooperation between the GOB and the ICDF
will focus on the full training of appropriate local personnel in order to facilitate
sufficient counterparts. These local agents are then also more familiar with the local
Belizean practices in terms of culture (life-style) and language.
These paradoxal results of Taiwan’s technical mission invalidate the positive
expectations of the appropriateness of South-South development projects. When the
Taiwanese came to Belize they said they wanted to “teach the Belizean people how to
fish, instead of giving them fish”. Even though they might have taught some Belizeans
how to fish, most of them were just receiving some little fish instead. One of the main
criticisms of North-South development assistance has been that the beneficiaries have
little input in the project planning and implementation process. In most North-South
assistance, projects are largely conceived, planned, and implemented by bureaucrats of
the donor and recipient governments (Bobiash, 1992). Consequently, it is not suprising
that these projects had great difficulty in mobilizing human resources other than those
provided by the donor. Unfortunately, this South-South project did not deviate from this
pattern. In fact, the Taiwanese did not draw any lessons from earlier experiences from
their northern counterparts, instead they displayed similar weaknesses.
Bearing in mind that there exists an immense variety of donors, recipiens, types of
projects, and environments in which they are implemented, generalizing about
development projects should be approached with great caution. Nonetheless, this study
did not provide a clear evidence to support the claim that South-South development
assistance is more appropriate than those supported by northern donors. Moreover, this
case of the Taiwanese effort to transfer their “Taiwan experience” is just another
example that political and economic motives are not the right starting point for any
organization to offer development assistance. As the Taiwanese development assistance
is mainly focussed on their intention to withstand their countries’ isolated background, a
clear view on the actual impact is hindered. Moreover, as long as the political and
economic input of ICDF is driven by self-interest, it remains unlikely that their projects
will have a humanitarian outcome.
Nevertheless, given the fact that development assistance is becoming a scarce
resource worldwide, Taiwan’s development organization ICDF in specific, and
South-South development assistance in general, can without a doubt contribute in
ensuring its continued existence in being a useful, if limited, developmental tool. The
challenge now for developing countries and countries in transition interested in
promoting South-South development is to build on its strenghts, its comparative
advantages, and to seek refinements in present approaches where they could bring
improvements (Bobiash, 1992). In doing so, they should bear in mind the lessons learned
by their northern counterparts and take examples from projects and approaches that
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have worked well in different sectors. As well, it should again be stressed that
South-South development assistance also has many achievements and potential.
Notes
1. Also referred to as “less developed”, “undeveloped”, “underdeveloped”, “south”, and
“backward”.
2. Belize Government is based on the Westminister model.
3. For a more detailed description of Taiwan’s history, see Hsiao and Hsiao (2002).
4. Such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of
Transportation and Communication, the Council of Agriculture, the Taiwan Institute of
Economic Research, The International Commercial Bank, and other related government
organs.
5. Minister of Agriculture, Minister of National Development, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Government Official Immigration Department, Chief ICDF, and Second Secretary Embassy
of Taiwan.
6. Hon. Michael Espat.
7. Relatively large-scale farms providing bananas, sugar cane, and mangoes with extensions of
more than 50 acres.
8. Belizean slang for Chinese farmer.
9. An environment in which development can be undertaken by the people themselves
(Marsden and Oakley, 1990, p. 4).
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